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Abstract: Since 1990, both the U.S. and Germany have substantially 
reformed their corporate governance regimes as part of an emerging 
paradigm of international finance capitalism increasingly dependent on 
securities markets and private shareholding.  Corporate governance 
reform and the emergence of finance capitalism, however, presents a 
double paradox.  First, the development of financial markets and the 
increasing importance of market relations, often linked to the 
diminution of state power, have been accompanied by a substantial and 
ongoing expansion of law and regulatory capacity into the private sphere 
to boost shareholder protections.  Second, center-left parties in both 
countries took advantage of economic crises to press for pro-shareholder 
reforms against center-right opposition allied with managerial elites. 
This article explains these developments by analyzing reform processes 
in United States and Germany over the past decade. It argues that 
changing economic conditions empowered reformist state actors, and 
that they have played a central and largely autonomous role in driving 
the substantial institutional change underway in contemporary 
capitalism.  The analysis also suggests that political conflict over 
corporate governance is likely to intensify, on the right and the left, as it 
impinges on the basic allocation of power within corporations and thus 
the political economy. 
iv
  
I. INTRODUCTION: BEYOND ENRON 
The collapse of the 1990s stock market bubbles in the United 
States and Europe led to a wave of massive corporate finance 
scandals in the United States and stock market crashes around the 
world.  Corporate finance scandals, such as Enron, Global 
Crossing, World Com, and Adelphia, joined by European 
counterparts such as the Netherlands’ Ahold and Italy’s Parmalat, 
have made securities market regulation and the internal structure 
and governance of the corporation critical issues of public concern.  
The spotlight on these scandals obscures the most important part 
of the story: a cross-national trend towards greater legal protection 
of shareholder interests within the capital markets and the 
publicly traded corporate firm itself.  Economic crises have 
prompted corporate governance reform as part of a new paradigm 
of “finance capitalism” defined by the growth of international and 
domestic capital markets, the increasing importance of 
sophisticated financial services, and an expanding class of private 
investors.    This article explains the processes of corporate 
governance reform in United States and Germany over the past 
decade and how they challenge prevailing explanations of political 
economic change.  These cases illustrate how changing social and 
economic conditions impose new demands on the state and offer 
state actors opportunities to expand state capacity, develop new 
instruments of state authority and power, and fashion and 
implement new policies.   
The regulatory framework of finance capitalism facilitates the 
development and integration of securities markets and the 
formation of large pools of private investment capital by 
addressing fundamental problems of information and power 
asymmetries within capital markets and the corporation.  
Regulatory politics defines the national corporate governance 
regimes that lie at the structural core of the new finance 
capitalism.  Corporate governance law performs a crucial 
regulatory function by ordering the power relationships, 
information flows, decision-making processes, and economic 
incentives within the foundational economic institution of 
 CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES [VOL. 01 NO. 01 
 
2 
 
modern capitalism—the corporation.  As corporate governance 
changes, so too does the character of contemporary capitalism.   
The emergence of finance capitalism, however, presents a double 
paradox.  First, the development of financial markets and the 
increasing importance of market relations, often linked to the 
diminution of state power, have been accompanied by a 
substantial and ongoing expansion of law and regulatory capacity.  
The conduct of parties within the securities markets and the 
internal structure of the corporate firm are increasingly 
determined by law and the steady centralization of regulatory 
authority at the national level.  Second, center-left parties, 
historically reliant on working class support and hostile to the 
interests of financial capital, pressed for pro-shareholder reforms in 
the face of resistance from conservatives allied with managerial 
elites.  The center-left in the United States and Germany took 
advantage of very different sorts of economic crisis conditions to 
successfully pursue these policy agendas in distinctive ways.  The 
sudden and traumatic character of the post-Enron corporate 
governance crisis and the neo-liberal pluralist politics in the 
United States produced a rapid but relatively short-lived reform 
movement.  German corporate governance reform evolved in the 
context of a longer-term crisis of economic performance, coupled 
with EU-driven market integration, and far more coordinated 
policymaking institutions.  Consequently, the German reforms 
were consensual, transformative, and sustained over more than a 
decade. 
These paradoxes challenge prevailing theoretical approaches to 
corporate governance in important ways. Corporate governance 
reform poses the questions of both how state actors, through law 
and regulation, have come to restructured fundamental economic 
relationships, and why they have done so.  Neo-liberal theories 
predict convergence on a more a laissez faire, market centered 
economic model.  This perspective fails to explain the state’s 
substantially increased regulatory intervention in the economy 
that has accompanied corporate governance reform.  Financial 
regulations and regulatory bodies exist where before there were 
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none. Law restructures the internal structure and power relations 
of the corporation in new and pathbreaking ways.  Corporate 
governance reform in the United States, as the leading “liberal 
market economy,” and Germany, as the leading “coordinated 
market economy” (Hall and Soskice 2001), sheds light on cross-
national trends in reform processes, the role of the state in the 
economy, and the relative trajectories of American and German 
capitalism.  Yet much recent work in contemporary comparative 
political economy, particularly the “varieties of capitalism” 
literature, maintains that institutional differences among national 
economies are path dependent, locked into place by the 
comparative economic advantages these arrangements confer on 
domestic firms.  (E.g., Hall and Soskice, 2001)  This description 
fails to explain the degree of political economic change that has 
occurred in recent years and the intensely political processes that 
construct corporate governance regimes.   
Political elites in the United States and Germany pursued 
corporate governance reform by expanding, centralizing, and 
institutionalizing regulation in the interests of shareholders and 
finance capital.  These reforms served the interests of political 
elites by using capital market pressures to constrain managerial 
autonomy, shore up political economic legitimacy, increase 
corporate efficiency, and improve aggregate economic 
performance.  They reflect the capacity of state actors to influence 
and take advantage of changing economic conditions, interest 
group preferences, and public opinion by framing public policy 
debates and constructing interest group alliances to overcome path 
dependence.  These developments contradict images of stable 
political economic equilibria, associated with path dependence 
theory, as well as neo-liberal predictions of state retreat. Instead, 
we are seeing the emergence of varieties of finance capitalism 
analogous to the varieties of post-war capitalism. 
This article identifies the main trends in corporate governance 
reform in the United States and Germany in historical and 
political context.  Part II sets out a brief sketch of the legal, 
institutional, and ideological features of American and German 
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corporate governance regimes prior to the 1990s.  These regimes 
embodied, respectively, distinctive liberal market and coordinated 
market variants of post-war capitalism, and each contained 
tensions and flaws that would trigger the reforms of the past 
fifteen years.  Part III discusses the political responses to economic 
and corporate governance crises and shows how institutional 
structures influenced the course and content of the American and 
German corporate governance reforms since 1990.  Part IV 
concludes with a political analysis of these reforms and their 
implications for the developmental trajectories of the American 
and German governance models.   
II.  THE REGULATORY STATE, PUBLIC LAW, AND THE 
CORPORATE FIRM  
Corporate governance regimes structure the allocation of power 
among managers, shareholders, and employees— the principal 
groups involved in corporate affairs.1  A tripartite legal structure of 
company (or corporate) law, securities regulation, and labor 
relations law defines the juridical relationships among these 
groups and is a central feature of national political economies.  
(Cioffi 2002a: 1-2; 2000)  The United States and Germany 
represent very distinct political economic models defined by 
“liberal market” and “coordinated market” institutional 
arrangements, respectively.2 (See Tables 1 and 2) 
                                            
1 Cioffi 2002a: 1; cf. Gerke 1998 (quotation omitted).  This definition of the term 
corporate governance goes well beyond the narrow confines of the shareholder-
manager (principal-agent) relationship that preoccupies the vast majority of 
scholarship in law and economics.  This definition more accurately describes 
the function of corporate governance and its relationship to the broader political 
economy.   
2 See Hall and Soskice 2001.  For a classic expression of a political economic 
typology in the study of national financial systems, see Zysman, 1983.  An 
updated analysis of national corporate governance regimes from this typological 
perspective is presented in Cioffi, 2000 and Cioffi and Cohen, 1999. 
  
TABLES 1: POST-WAR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODELS IN THE UNITED STATES (C. 1985) 
UNITED STATES 
REGULATION CORRELATED PRACTICE 
SECURITIES 
LAW 
• Centralized federal securities regulation by SEC imposes 
stringent & highly prescriptive transparency & disclosure 
rules. 
• SEC proxy rules grant managers effective control over 
nominations and elections to the board of directors. 
• Self-regulation and private rulemaking in accounting industry. 
• Securities markets highly capitalized, substantial use of equity 
finance & financial innovation, but an accompanying 
fragmentation of ownership (separation of ownership & control). 
• Managerial domination of the firm built into corporate structure. 
• Weak oversight of accounting industry. 
COMPANY 
LAW  
• State law governs internal firm structure & affairs (no uniform 
federal corporate law). 
• Fiduciary duty law favors shareholders’ interests over other 
stakeholders. 
• Corporate law statutes & jurisprudence permits wide variety 
of anti-takeover defenses. 
• Broad managerial & board discretion in running firm.  
• Corporate law & intra-firm governance favors managerial 
interests. 
• Stakeholders receive little legal protection, creating bias in favor 
of short-term financial interests. 
• Fiduciary law weakened—strengthens position of managers & 
limits protection of shareholders & stakeholders alike. 
LABOR LAW 
• Law favors decentralized unions & firm-level bargaining. 
• Law sharply separated from corporate law to preserve 
managerial autonomy. 
• Weak, fragmented unions pursue contractual “business 
unionism”. 
• Contractual labor relations separate from firm governance (no 
codetermination). 
ENFORCEMENT 
MECHANISMS 
• Formal & litigious enforcement of complex prescriptive rules. 
• Legal rules favor enforcement through private litigation. 
• High incidence of litigation. 
• Wealthy & politically active plaintiffs’ bar. 
 
  
 
TABLE 2: POST-WAR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODELS IN GERMANY (C. 1985) 
GERMANY 
REGULATION Correlated Practice 
SECURITIES 
LAW 
• Weak state (Länder) transparency and disclosure regulation. 
• No federal regulation or regulator. 
• Weak shareholder rights against fraud, insider trading. 
• Opaque financial reporting. 
• Bank-centered financial system & undeveloped securities markets.
• Concentrated stockholding & networks of ownership & control.  
COMPANY 
LAW  
• Federal company law imposes uniform rules & firm structure. 
• Supervisory board codetermination in large public firms. 
• Board members obliged to act in “the interests of the 
enterprise” (not the shareholders) 
• No pro-managerial “race to the bottom”; fosters stable system of 
stakeholder representation & governance. 
• Employees are a core stakeholder group. 
• Weak fiduciary obligations; no principle of shareholder primacy. 
LABOR LAW 
• Sectoral bargaining framework between centralized industrial 
unions & employer associations. 
• Strong employee rights and powers under works council 
codetermination. 
• Cooperative labor relations rest on strong unions. 
• Functional split between unions & works councils takes wage 
issues taken out of firm governance, leaving work hours, 
organization, etc. to be resolved through firm governance. 
ENFORCEMENT 
MECHANISMS 
• Weak governmental enforcement; procedural & substantive 
restrictions on private law suits reduces use of litigation. 
• Governance by negotiation among opposing interests (micro-
corporatism) within the firm. 
2005] CORP. GOVERNANCE REFORM IN THE US AND GERMANY 7  
 
In each case, characteristic institutional structures and power 
relations are replicated at multiple levels of the state, market, and 
corporate firm.  These formal arrangements are the product of 
political forces and cannot be explained as flowing from economic 
efficiency or functional necessity alone.   
A. THE UNITED STATES: BETWEEN NEO-LIBERALISM AND THE 
REGULATORY STATE 
The American economy has experienced waves of wrenching crisis 
and restructuring during the past thirty years.  The Fordist model 
of mass production relied on large integrated and oligopolistic 
industrial firms, managerial autonomy from shareholders, long-
planning horizons, stable sources of capital, and predictable 
product cycles in predictably expanding markets.  The collapse of 
the Bretton Woods monetary regime, oil shocks, and stagflation 
during the 1970s undermined these foundations of Fordism and 
triggered a prolonged period of economic crisis.  
Deindustrialization, erosion of domestic and export market shares, 
and the collapse of organized labor heralded the end of the post-
war economic order.  The wave of hostile takeovers, mergers, and 
acquisitions during the 1980s signaled the arrival of a new, 
volatile, and financially driven form of economic organization.  
Securities markets became more than simply another source of 
finance; they drove corporate—and thus economic—restructuring.   
The United States had a head start in the development of this new 
paradigm of finance capitalism.  Its securities markets were 
already well developed in terms of liquidity, stock market 
capitalization, and the proportion of publicly listed firms.  
Underlying this economic and financial structure was a well-
developed legal and regulatory structure dating back to its political 
origins in the New Deal.  The structure of American corporate 
governance encouraged reliance on rapidly-shifting arm’s-length 
economic relationships rather than on longer-term relational ties 
among management, capital, and labor.  American law embodied 
the state’s relatively non-interventionist approach to the internal 
affairs of the corporation that preserved an expansive private 
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sphere of corporate and managerial autonomy bounded by a highly 
developed framework of formal legal rights, obligations, and 
regulatory rules.  This legal framework simultaneously 
concentrated power in the hands of the CEO and other senior 
managers and protected shareholders.   
American corporate law is distinctive in that it has been the 
responsibility of state, not federal, law.  State company laws 
function as general enabling statutes that create the bare minima 
of the corporate form— limited liability, legal capacity, a board of 
directors, and basic fiduciary duties and shareholder rights.  
Otherwise, corporate law gives managers and directors wide 
discretion in how to structure and manage the firm.  American 
corporate law allows managers to sit on the board of directors—
essentially supervising themselves.  Federal securities regulations 
have long given management control over the nomination and 
election of directors.  In theory, the fiduciary duties of corporate 
directors and officers should counterbalance the weakness of 
shareholders in corporate governance.  American corporate law 
provides comparatively favorable procedural mechanisms to sue 
for breach of these fiduciary duties.  In practice, however, the 
“business judgment rule” substantially dilutes fiduciary duties by 
exempting from liability those decisions taken in good faith in the 
ordinary course of business.  
With the rise of the regulatory state in the 1930s, the United 
States pioneered modern securities regulation.  Congress 
empowered the Securities and Exchange Commission—a strong, 
federal regulatory agency—to ensure the efficient functioning of 
national securities markets.  The SEC’s mission was to make the 
markets work through federal market-reinforcing disclosure 
regulation.  The SEC was charged with drafting and enforcing 
elaborate registration, disclosure, and securities trading rules, and 
with overseeing the administration of stock exchanges.  Strong 
transparency, disclosure, and insider trading regulations were 
designed to protect minority shareholders, facilitate market 
transactions, and legitimate the country’s market-driven financial 
system.  Within this regulatory framework, the "external" capital 
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markets in the United States became among the most developed 
and liquid in the world with a high proportion of publicly traded 
firms and a sophisticated financial services sector.   
Both labor and shareholders were hobbled by the American 
corporate governance regime.  American corporate governance law 
wholly excluded employees, protecting managerial prerogatives 
from encroachment by collective bargaining or other potential 
forms of employee influence.3  Subjects such as investment, 
marketing, product design, production plans, and financial 
strategies are considered within the “core of entrepreneurial 
control.”  At the same time, federal law segmented the financial 
services industry and mandated portfolio diversification, 
precluding the use of concentrated equity ownership as a means of 
checking of managerial power.4  The distinctive combination of 
corporate law managerialism, strong transparency and disclosure 
regulation under securities law, along with the legal 
marginalization of labor, constitute the basic structural features of 
the American corporate governance regime. 
The American corporate governance regime embodies a 
complementary and mutually reinforcing relationship between the 
market-driven financial system and a legalistic, transparency-
based regulatory regime.  The weakness of shareholders within 
corporate governance encouraged investors to respond to 
                                            
3 See NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); Fibreboard Paper Prods. 
Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); see also Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 
488, 498 (1979) (quoting Fibreboard); First National Maintenance Corp. v. 
NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).   
4The Glass-Steagall Act severed investment banking from commercial banking 
and traditional lending; the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 limited the size of the stakes 
investment firms and funds could hold as a percentage of their own capital and 
of outstanding corporate equity.  Under these deliberately fragmented 
ownership conditions, shareholders could not solve the collective action 
problem of coordinating and compensating the monitoring of managers.  See 
generally See Roe, 1998, 1994, 1993b, 1991, 1990.     
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management problems through exit by selling their stakes rather 
than active participation through voice.  (See, e.g., Roe, 1991; 
Coffee, 1991; cf. Hirschman, 1970)  Relatively stringent disclosure 
regulation contributed to the development of highly liquid 
markets that allowed shareholders to exit from ownership by 
selling shares quickly.  The reliance on exit increased the 
importance of and demand for prescriptive financial disclosure 
regulation to protect shareholders from market failures caused by 
pervasive informational asymmetries.   
This governance regime contained a set of structural flaws.  These 
deficiencies were well known to commentators and policymakers 
prior to 2000 and some earnest attempts to address them failed 
politically.  First, the largely self-regulating character of an 
accounting industry that had come to treat auditing as a loss 
leader to sell more lucrative consulting services undermined 
securities regulation that depended on disclosure of accurate 
information.  Second, state corporate law and SEC proxy voting 
regulations under federal securities law give shareholders virtually 
no power to nominate or elect representatives to the board.  This 
legal framework entrenched the domination of the boards of 
directors by the very management who, in principle, they were 
charged with overseeing.5  Third, institutional investors were not 
willing or able to actively monitor management as advocated by 
many commentators, corporate governance activists, 
policymakers, and academic theorists.  Together, these structural 
defects would contribute to the systemic corporate governance 
crisis that peaked in 2001-2002.   
                                            
5 Into the 1990s, even as the jobs of CEO and board chair were split with 
increasing frequency and larger numbers of non-managerial directors sat on 
boards, CEOs and senior managers largely dominated the very institutional 
body that was supposed to render them accountable to shareholders. 
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B.  GERMANY: THE COORDINATED MARKET MODEL AND THE 
MICROCORPORATIST FIRM 
The post-war German political economy and corporate governance 
regime stood in sharp contrast to the neo-liberal American model.6  
A bank-centered financial system, networks of corporate cross-
ownership, and interlocking boards stabilized financial and 
ownership relations within and among firms, freeing management 
to strategize for long-term growth.  Strong labor unions and 
codetermination incorporated labor into economic and corporate 
governance in ways that further encouraged long-term planning 
and discouraged the pursuit of short-term financial returns. 
Overarching these arrangements, institutionalized bargaining 
among peak associations coordinated economic relations at the 
firm, sectoral, and national levels.  The German corporate 
governance law channeled multiple contending stakeholder 
interests into largely self-regulating, long-term bargaining 
relationships.   
Until the mid-1990s, the framework of German securities and 
company law was the mirror image of the American structure.  In 
contrast to the centralized federal securities regulation and state 
level corporate law of the United States, Germany had a uniform 
federal company law and fragmented securities regulation that 
dispersed legal authority among the Länder (states) and eight local 
self-regulating stock exchanges.  Disclosure regulations and 
accounting rules were weak.  Company finances remained opaque.  
Moreover, the law provided few effective avenues for private 
litigation to enforce shareholder rights.  In place of American-style 
transparency regulation, Germany’s corporate governance regime 
relied on the power of large banks to monitor managers.  
Germany’s bank-centered financial system defined a set of stable, 
interlocking ownership and governance relationships based on 
concentrated ownership, extensive cross-shareholding networks, 
                                            
6 See Vagts, 1966; O’Sullivan, 2000; Roe, 1994, 1993b; Charkham, 1994.   
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and long-term relational finance ties between banks and corporate 
borrowers.  Relational finance by banks ameliorated pressures for 
maximizing short-term financial returns and encouraged long-term 
adjustment and growth strategies by industrial enterprises that 
could balance the competing demands of capital and labor.   
Large German “universal banks” combined lending, securities 
underwriting, brokerage, and trading at the core of the financial 
system.  Consequently, these banks were simultaneously 
important lenders to, and major shareholders in, publicly traded 
firms.  Further, under German law, banks wield even greater 
voting power by casting the votes of many of the shares deposited 
with them, if authorized by their depositor-brokerage clients.7  
Bank representation on the supervisory board frequently cemented 
the combination of voting power with long-term relational lender 
and shareholding relationships.  In theory, the banks’ status as 
shareholders aligned their interests with those of other 
shareholders; and the banks’ power within firm governance 
presumably protected these other investors.  In fact, banks did not 
play the active monitoring role assumed by conventional wisdom 
and the contradictory status of the banks as lenders first and 
shareholders second generated conflicts of interest that law and 
regulation did not police or remedy.  Absent strong shareholder 
protection or strong incentives for major banks to cultivate equity 
finance, relatively few German firms were publicly traded and 
securities markets remained far less developed than in the United 
States. 
                                            
7 Thus, in addition to their own equity holdings, the banks wield 
disproportionate voting strength and substantial leverage when it comes to 
board nominations or influencing key strategic decisions.  Charkham, 1994: 37-
38; Vagts, 1966: 53-58.  Even where German management attempts to maintain 
autonomy by diversifying sources of bank debt, Deeg, 1992: p. 208, banks have 
adopted a practice of designating a "lead bank" to monitor the corporation, vote 
their aggregate DSVRs, and maintain supervisory board representation.  Vitols, 
1995: p. 6. 
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Under German company law, public corporations 
(Aktiengesellschaft or “AG”) have a dual board structure in which 
the supervisory board (analogous to the American board of 
directors) is completely separate from the management board (a 
more collegial version of the CEO and senior management of the 
American firm) with no overlapping membership.  The 
supervisory board (“Aufsichtsrat”) appoints and supervises the 
managing board (“Vorstand”) and formulates (or at least approves) 
major corporate policies and strategies.  The shareholders’ meeting 
(Annual General Meeting, or AGM) has the right to receive 
relevant information and vote on a broad range of issues, including 
mergers, acquisitions, capital increases, and major changes in 
business strategies.  German company law relied on the internal 
corporate institutions, the board and AGM, to constrain 
managerial power rather than the discipline of stock markets.  
These institutional constraints were designed to protect the 
interests of creditor banks and employees as important 
stakeholders of the firm. 
Labor codetermination, the incorporation of employees into the 
firm’s governance institutions, replicated Germany’s highly 
organized labor relations at the firm level.  Codetermination 
through strong works councils and supervisory board 
representation embodied the stakeholder vision of the corporation 
as an institutional and organizational entity.  (See, e.g., 
Katzenstein, 1987: Chap. 3; Wiedemann, 1980)  Company and 
labor relations law create microcorporatist structures that 
facilitate negotiation, compromise, cooperation, and consensus 
within firm governance.8  Board codetermination became 
                                            
8 Supervisory board codetermination under the Codetermination Act of 1976, 
perhaps the most striking feature of German company law, requires most 
corporations with over 2,000 employees appoint equal number of shareholder 
and employee representatives to their supervisory boards.  Wiedemann, 1980: 
79.  Firms with 500 to 2,000 employees must set aside only one-third of the 
board seats for employee representatives.  Wiedemann, 1980: 80.  “Montan” 
codetermination, the third (and original) variant, only applies to firms in the 
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enormously important as a symbol of the country’s consensus-
driven “social market economy,” but its practical import has been 
modest.  Works council codetermination, in contrast, provides a 
second and more important form employee representation in firm 
governance.9  Works councils wield substantial influence within 
the workplace through their ability to use information, 
consultation, and codetermination rights, and through their 
authority to demand compensation for economic injury to 
employees caused by managerial policy decisions.  Works council 
codetermination has also proved beneficial to firms as a way of 
cooperatively coordinating labor relations in workplaces staffed by 
highly skilled and productive employees.  Within this stakeholder 
governance model, a “microcorporatist” firm structure (cf. 
Assmann, 1990; Streeck, 1984) curtails managerial power and 
incorporates and protects the interests of both capital and labor.   
The stakeholder governance model underpinned and legitimated 
the post-war economic order. It also facilitated the incremental 
innovations in industrial production that enabled German 
industry to focus on high quality and high value-added market 
niches, and allowed it to pay high wages and invest heavily in skill 
formation.  (See Streeck, 1984, 1987, 1991, Vitols, 1991)  But these 
comparative advantages came at an increasingly steep price during 
                                                                                                                
coal, mining, and steel sectors employing more than 1,000 workers, provides for 
full parity of shareholder and employee representation.  The decline of the 
mining and steel sectors in Germany has reduced the importance of Montan 
codetermination.  For an excellent recent review of board codetermination, see 
Prigge, 1998. 
9 Wiedemann, 1980: 80-82.  The Works Constitution Act of 1972 provides for 
the election of works councils in facilities or plants of business organizations 
with five or more permanent employees, but many large firms voluntarily 
instituted enterprise (or Konzern) works councils covering an entire corporate 
group to ensure stable and cooperative labor relations.  For general discussions 
of the political origins and impact of codetermination, see, e.g., Vagts, 1966: 64-
78; Streeck, 1984; Katzenstein, 1987: Chapter 3; Muller-Jentsch, 1995.  For the 
role of works councils in German labor relations, see Thelen, 1991; cf. Turner, 
1991.   
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the 1990s.  Export markets became increasingly unstable, 
international competition stiffened, profits from traditional bank 
lending declined as a result of market saturation, and German 
reunification proved enormously expensive and destabilizing.  (See 
Streeck, 1997)  Growth stagnated at less than two per cent while 
unemployment soared to over ten per cent.  By the early 1990s, 
German politicians faced the twin problems of intensifying 
pressures to reform sources of economic rigidity and potent 
resistance to structural changes that might undermine Germany’s 
comparative advantages and/or antagonize powerful interest 
groups. 
 
III. POLITICS AND POLICY REFORM 
A. THE AMERICAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CRISIS AND THE 
POLITICS OF PUNCTUATED REFORM 
During the 1980s and 1990s, corporate governance became an 
increasingly important and divisive policy domain in the United 
States.  Yet partisan and interest group conflict blocked 
substantial reform until the pressures generated by the post-Enron 
corporate governance crisis of 2001-2002 briefly overcame the path 
dependence and political paralysis that had characterized the 
policy area.  The hostile takeover wave of the 1980s focused 
popular and political attention on corporate governance and 
questions of managerial and financial power as managers 
mobilized coalitions with organized labor and grass-roots 
community groups to erect a wide variety of anti-takeover 
defenses.10  Following the decline of hostile takeovers, the rise of 
                                            
10 By the early 1990s, these legal changes effectively protected incumbent 
managers from hostile takeovers and had largely eliminated the market for 
corporate control.  There continued to be an extraordinarily vibrant market for 
companies—which reached its apogee during the 1990s boom and stock market 
bubble.  However, the overwhelming majorities of mergers and acquisitions 
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institutional investors and mass shareholding gave rise to a new, if 
fragmented, constituency favoring pro-shareholder reform.  Over 
the course of the 1990s, as evidence of flaws in the American 
corporate governance regime accumulated, policy shifted between 
strengthening traditional disclosure regulation and using 
institutional investors as corporate monitors.   
A combination of fragmented governmental institutions with 
multiple veto points on policymaking, political polarization, and 
the influence of interest groups hostile to reform precluded major 
systemic corporate governance reforms during the 1980s and 1990s 
even as problems of poor auditing, balance sheet manipulation, 
excessive CEO pay, and value-destroying merger and acquisition 
activity became evident.  (Cioffi, 2005)  Conflicts pitted 
managerialist business and professional groups along with anti-
regulation politicians against shareholder groups, pension funds, 
unions, regulators, and pro-regulation politicians.  (Id.)  
Federal corporate governance policy was caught between pro-
shareholder and managerial forces during the 1990s and  swerved 
between increased protection of shareholder interests and the 
preservation of managerial power and autonomy.  The SEC pushed 
for more shareholder protections, but also suffered noteworthy 
political defeats over attempts to limit the consulting work done 
by accounting firms for their auditing clients and to require the 
expensing of stock options.11  At the same time, pro-shareholder 
                                                                                                                
during the 1990s were friendly deals that often richly rewarded senior managers.  
(See, e.g., Cioffi 2002a, chap. 4) 
11 SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, a Clinton appointee, sought to prohibit 
accounting firms from doing both auditing and consulting work for corporations 
that presented a conflict of interest and might compromise the integrity of 
audits.  Accounting firms enlisted allies in Congress to fight the regulatory 
proposal, which was withdrawn after members of Congress threatened to cut 
the SEC’s already inadequate budget.  Likewise, the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) and the SEC under Levitt failed in an attempt to require 
the expensing of stock options in corporate financial statements.  Business 
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groups were split between those favoring expanded disclosure and 
those seeking to encourage monitoring of management by 
institutional investors.  The peculiar vacillations of SEC policy 
during the 1990s reflected this political and ideological conflict.  
In 1992, the SEC amended its proxy rules to encourage corporate 
governance activism by large institutional investors by making it 
easier to communicate with each other and with management.12  
The 1992 proxy rule amendments used structural regulation that 
altered the institutional structure of the firm to modify behavior.  
In August 2000, the SEC shifted direction with the adoption of 
Regulation “Fair Disclosure” (“Regulation FD”).  Regulation FD 
prohibited corporate managers from selectively disclosing material 
information to favored analysts, financial institutions, and 
institutional investors.13  The rule undermined the SEC’s own 1992 
proxy reforms.  The 1992 reforms took it for granted that 
institutional investors would act on behalf of all shareholders; 
Regulation FD presumed they were self-interested and potentially 
collusive insiders.  While addressing the problem of informational 
asymmetries between small investors and large institutions, 
Regulation FD limited the ability of institutional investors to 
pursue corporate governance activism.  Transparency regulation 
and structural regulation relying on institutional activism have 
always been in tension.  By the end of 2000, these two paradigms 
                                                                                                                
lobbies, led by “new economy” technology firms dependent on options enlisted 
bipartisan congressional and executive branch support to quash to the initiative. 
12 The 1992 proxy rule changes appear to have encouraged greater governance 
activism by institutional investors, but at the expense of transparency in 
governance.  Institutional investors, with some notable exceptions, preferred to 
voice their concerns and criticisms to management in private communications 
that would not become public.  These communications thus became occasions 
for managers to disclose significant information to the representative of 
institutional investors and analysts associated with investment banks and 
brokerages.   
13 Regulation FD expressly rejected any private cause of action enabling 
enforcement by shareholder litigation and thus continued the anti-litigation 
trend of the 1990s.  Regulation FD is a prescriptive rule without any effective 
enforcement mechanism other than a (rare) SEC enforcement action.   
 CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES [VOL. 01 NO. 01 
 
18 
 
of corporate governance regulation and reform had collided on the 
levels of politics, law, and investor relations.   
The bursting of the stock market bubble in 2000, with the loss of 
over $7 trillion in stock market valuation, and the post-bubble 
corporate finance scandals of 2001-2002 unveiled the vast 
corruption and fraud that accompanied the economic and 
investment boom of the late-1990s.  The massive financial 
scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, Adelphia, Tyco, 
and other major corporations stoked popular resentment of 
corporate and financial elites, inflaming political support for more 
wide-ranging reform of the American corporate governance 
regime.  The most severe legitimacy crisis of the American 
financial and corporate governance systems since the Great 
Depression disrupted the grip of a conservative coalition that had 
favored minimal regulation and blocked reform through the 1990s.  
By the spring of 2002, political leaders began to fear that the 
American securities markets and financial system as a whole 
might collapse after the successive shocks of the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001 and the seemingly endless series of 
corporate finance scandals and bankruptcies stretching from late-
2001 through 2002. 
The extraordinary scope, severity, and duration of these financial 
scandals undermined the legitimacy of managerial and 
professional elites and their political allies who opposed 
substantial corporate governance reform.  The legitimacy crisis 
created a rare interregnum of partisan and interest group politics.  
The growing public outrage over the scandals and market losses 
allowed the Democratic Party to seize the policy agenda.  The 
Bush administration, congressional Republicans, and the SEC, 
having resisted calls for reform, lost influence over the legislative 
process.   
The single most striking and important feature of the reform 
politics of 2001-2002 was the virtual absence of interest group 
influence and the predominance of entrepreneurial political actors 
in Congress.  Tainted by scandal, corporate managers and 
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accounting firms remained peripheral to the legislative process. 14  
Business interests were deeply divided over the reform effort.  The 
spiraling corporate governance crisis induced a significant number 
of leading financial figures, including billionaire investor Warren 
Buffett, former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, and 
Goldman Sachs CEO Henry Paulson, to publicly support 
legislative and regulatory reform.  In the end, even the Business 
Roundtable, the preeminent lobbying group of corporate managers, 
submitted to the forces of reform.   
The financial services sector also was divided over the proper 
extent of corporate governance reform and government regulation.  
Leading investment firms understood the depth of the crisis and 
had an enormous stake in ensuring that it was contained—by 
regulatory reform if necessary.  Financial institutions, such as 
investment banks, dependent on public faith in the integrity of the 
securities markets, but also privileged insiders that benefited from 
the status quo, were split over the reforms.  They were also 
weakened politically by their implication in broader scandals, 
including dishonesty and conflicts of interests in stock analysis, 
manipulating initial public offerings, and aiding dishonest 
corporate executives.   
Large public employee and union pension funds and institutional 
investor groups (such as CalPERS, TIAA-CREF, and the Council of 
Institutional Investors) shifted their policy preferences 
dramatically in support of increased regulatory stringency and 
intervention in corporate governance.  The AFL-CIO and labor 
unions, because of their close connection to union pension funds 
and their members’ reliance on private pension investments, were 
strongly supportive of corporate governance reform and were 
                                            
14 The only issue managers fought fiercely was, perhaps revealingly but not 
surprisingly, the regulation and more stringent accounting treatment of stock 
options—the mechanism that was supposed to align the interests of managers 
and shareholders, but which became the most effective means of managerial 
rent-seeking ever devised. 
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instrumental in rounding up Democratic votes in Congress.  In 
contrast, mutual funds and corporate pension funds remained 
indifferent or hostile to reform.  Neither group of institutional 
investors had an appreciable influence on the substance of the 
reforms.   
Senate Democrats drove the drafting and passage of the reform 
legislation against the opposition of anti-regulation Republicans in 
Congress, the White House, and the SEC.  The Senate Democrats 
had the temporary advantage of being in the majority and thus 
were able to frame and advance the reform agenda.  The 
Democrats seized upon the scandals and reform as a way to attack 
the Republicans for their anti-regulation neo-liberalism while 
appealing to middle class voters with their long-established vision 
of a regulatory state that protected ordinary Americans from the 
depredations of dishonest business elites.  The looming the 2002 
midterm elections were the Democrats’ leverage and political 
objective.  They capitalized on divisions among and within 
interest groups, holding hearings and drafting a reform bill as the 
scandals and the sense of financial crisis escalated through the first 
half of 2002.  By the late spring and early summer of 2002 the 
politics of reform had taken on a life of its own.  The collapse of 
World Com amid allegations of a multibillion-dollar accounting 
fraud finally broke Republican resistance in early July.  The Bush 
Administration and the Republican Congressional leadership 
sought to neutralize the scandals as a potent November 2002 
election issue, substantially accepting corporate governance 
reform as the price.  Senate Democrats pushed through the most 
comprehensive corporate governance reform in the United States 
since the 1930s with the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002.  In the words of one Republican staffer on Capitol Hill, 
“Congress didn’t pass Sarbanes-Oxley, WorldCom did.”15   
                                            
15 Interviews, Washington, DC, March 2004.  Interviewees inside and outside of 
government unanimously agreed that the World Com collapse broke Republican 
resistance to the Sarbanes bill.   
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Sarbanes-Oxley imposed a host of new requirements on publicly 
traded corporations, directors, corporate managers, accountants, 
and attorneys.  The law expanded the SEC’s authority and 
mandated the drafting of a host of new regulations governing 
accounting, auditing, financial disclosure, codes of ethics, risk 
management, and the internal governance structures and practices 
of public firms.  Most prominently, Sarbanes-Oxley created the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (the PCAOB), an 
entirely new private regulatory body appointed and overseen by 
the SEC, to enforce a new set of prescriptive regulations governing 
accounting standards and the activities of accounting firms in 
auditing and consulting.  The creation of the PCAOB, though a 
private non-profit entity, represents the federalization of 
accounting regulation, the displacement of the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) as the primary accounting 
rulemaking body, and the end of the predominantly self-regulatory 
character of the accounting profession.   
The second path-breaking aspect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is its 
intervention in the internal structure and affairs of the 
corporation—the first time federal law directly encroached on the 
traditional preserve of state corporation law.16  Similar to recent 
German reforms (discussed below), Sarbanes-Oxley strengthened 
the independence of the board and its control over external 
auditing.  Public firms are now required to appoint an auditing 
committee comprised entirely of independent directors and at 
least one member must be qualified as a financial expert.  The 
audit committee now has direct responsibility for the 
appointment, compensation, and oversight of the outside auditors, 
as well as approval of all auditor services.  Auditors now must 
report directly to the board audit committee, which must resolve 
any disputes between management and the auditors concerning 
                                            
16 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also increased civil and criminal penalties for a host 
of securities law violations, and extended the statute of limitations for security 
fraud suits, but the most important provisions of the Act were directed at the 
accounting industry and the structure of the corporation.   
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financial reporting.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also mandated 
enhanced internal and external monitoring, and certification of 
CEOs and CFOs as to the accuracy of the corporate balance sheet.  
This unprecedented—and underreported—federalization of 
corporate law represents a sharp break with nearly two centuries 
of American federalism and suggests the increased prominence of 
structural regulation as a governance mechanism in the United 
States.   
The Sarbanes-Oxley reforms were an exercise in damage control 
and the rehabilitation of systemic legitimacy (usually referred to as 
“investor confidence”) motivated by political opportunism and 
blame avoidance.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act reflects no elite 
consensus or coherent long-term policy agenda.  The political 
process was a sudden, reactive, and episodic response to scandal, 
popular outcry, and fears of systemic crisis.  Divisive party and 
interest group politics within a fragmented and veto-prone 
political structure meant that the window of opportunity would 
last only as long as the crisis that opened it.   
Following the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, the focus of regulatory 
politics moved from Congress to the SEC.  In enacting the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress substantially expanded the 
jurisdiction and powers of the SEC, but placed the agency in the 
middle of intense political conflicts.  These conflicts, in addition 
to a series of public gaffes and political missteps, ultimately forced 
SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt’s resignation.17  However, the 
continuing disclosure of scandals within financial markets and 
                                            
17 Pitt, President Bush’s appointee to succeed Levitt as head the SEC, had been a 
prominent securities lawyer on behalf of major accounting firms in private 
practice and his efforts to minimize the significance of the corporate scandals 
and to limit legislative reforms were regarded as suspect and illegitimate by 
reformers and, increasingly, by the public at large. The struggle over accounting 
regulation and appointments to the PCAOB ultimately resulted in the 
resignations of Pitt and the first Chairman of the Accounting Oversight Board, 
former FBI and CIA Director William Webster who was found to have been a 
director of a corporation charged with financial improprieties.   
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institutions raised the profile and importance of the SEC under 
Chairman William Donaldson (Pitt’s successor) to its highest level 
in decades.  But the rebound of SEC influence has stoked rather 
than subdued political conflicts over reform.   
These conflicts culminated in the battle over proposed SEC proxy 
voting rules giving shareholders greater influence over board 
nominations and elections.  A fundamental flaw of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act is its use of board reform to constrain managerial 
misconduct without reforming the proxy voting regulations that 
entrench management domination of boards of directors.  In an 
omission that underscores the persistant structural constraints on 
the agency of state actors even under crisis conditions, Congress 
had not addressed the issue of competitive board elections due to 
its politically explosive nature.  (Cioffi, 2005)  Business elites, 
largely acquiescent regarding other reforms, closed ranks against 
the SEC’s threatened change in the structural basis of managerial 
power.  After nearly a year of bitter conflict within the SEC, a 
combination of business, Bush administration, and Republican 
opposition in Congress fought the proposal to a standstill.  The 
Republican election victory in November 2004 effectively killed 
the proposed proxy voting rules—the only corporate governance 
reform successfully killed since the collapse of Enron in 2001.  His 
political standing and support eroded, SEC Chairman Donaldson 
resigned in June 2005.  The post-Enron era of corporate governance 
reform was over.  
B.  GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM: THE POLITICAL 
LOGIC OF SYSTEMIC CHANGE 
The German case presents corporate governance reform and the 
development of finance capitalism as the object of deliberate 
governmental policy and the product of sustained party and 
interest groups politics.  (Cioffi, 2002b)  The substantial and 
comprehensive transformation of the German corporate 
governance regime reflects a shift in policy preferences favoring 
financial modernization dating back to the Helmut Kohl’s CDU-
FDP government.  In the early 1990s, the Kohl government’s 
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policy veered sharply in favor of increased financial market 
regulation that the CDU leadership accepted as the price of 
European unity and the EU’s single market program to which it 
was committed.  But corporate governance reform would not have 
gone nearly so far since the mid-1990s without substantial 
domestic support among powerful interest groups.   
By the early 1990s, large segments of the German political and 
economic elites began to lose faith in the German corporate 
governance model.  By the late 1990s, they became beguiled by the 
high growth and employment rates, booming stock market, and 
dynamic high-tech sector in United States.  Declining profit 
margins caused by saturation and excessive competition in 
traditional bank lending, along with increasing domestic market 
penetration by British and American investment banks in financial 
services, triggered a shift in business strategies and policy 
preferences of most large German universal banks.  (Cioffi 2002b)  
By the early 1990s, large German banks began to appreciate 
financial system modernization and the cultivation of new 
financial services capacities as the route to higher profits, returns 
to equity, and more lucrative international markets.  (Cioffi 2002b; 
Lütz 1996, 2000)  The elements of the new business model 
reinforced one another: more sophisticated market-based financial 
services would boost bank profits; higher profits would increase 
returns to equity; these higher returns would raise the price of 
shares that could then be used to make strategic international 
acquisitions that would vault German banks into the “bulge 
bracket” of top international financial institutions. This shift in 
business strategies altered the banks’ policy preferences and 
mobilized their peak association, the powerful and well-organized 
BDB, and political allies in support of securities market and 
regulation reform.18  Beginning in the early 1990s, pro-EU CDU 
                                            
18 The globalization of finance and financial markets also reinforced domestic 
political pressures for financial and corporate governance reform as Frankfurt 
sought to remain competitive in retaining and attracting domestic and 
international capital.   
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and neo-liberal FDP politicians, large financial institutions, and 
the banking and finance center of Frankfurt overcame the 
resistance of the parochial interests of the Länder governments, 
Länder-based (and regulated) stock exchanges, and small firms and 
banks.  (See Cioffi 2002b; Lütz 1996)   
Corporate managers and the leadership of organized labor were 
divided over corporate governance reform and the development of 
finance capitalism.  Managers of many large German corporations, 
such as Daimler Benz and Siemens, backed much of the reform 
agenda.  These firms now had global operations and were 
increasingly interested in tapping foreign credit and securities 
markets that were out of reach so long as the German financial 
and corporate governance model remained insular and dominated 
by domestic insiders.  Union leaders, including those of IG Metall, 
Germany’s leading industrial union, realized that the German 
economy had slipped into a structural crisis and required reform to 
boost competitiveness.  Despite some skepticism, labor leaders 
were largely willing to accept financial system and corporate 
governance reforms so long as they did not disturb 
codetermination and collective bargaining arrangements, and did 
not shift the costs of restructuring onto employees.19  Shareholders, 
however, played virtually no political role in the reform of 
securities and company law—even though these reforms were 
ostensibly undertaken on their behalf.  Quite simply, given 
Germany’s historically undeveloped securities markets and lack of 
an equity culture of mass shareholding, shareholders were too few 
                                            
19 In this sense, German welfare state policy has helped facilitate reform and 
corporate restructuring.  The SPD government accommodated organized labor 
by extending generous unemployment and early retirement pension benefits to 
ease the impact of restructuring on the workforce.  This helped to shore up the 
support of its base constituencies and to deflect criticism of pro-finance and pro-
shareholder policies.  Germany has effectively socialized the risk and costs of 
restructuring, but at increasingly enormous costs in terms of pension outlays 
and structural unemployment.  (See Streeck 2003) 
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and too poorly organized to wield significant influence in policy 
debates.  Reforms were almost entirely a top-down process. 
The reform of securities law and regulation became a consensual 
policy among German political and economic elites, and it has 
proceeded apace since the mid-1990s.  The landmark Second 
Financial Market Promotion Act of 1994 transformed securities 
regulation and the legal and institutional foundations of German 
finance.20  The Act replaced the decentralized system of state-level 
exchange regulators and largely self-regulating stock exchanges 
with a centralized federal regulator, German Federal Securities 
Supervisory Office (Bundesaufsichtsamt für den 
Wertpapierhandel, or “BAWe”).  Over the remainder of the 1990s 
further legislation and regulatory rulemaking steadily expanded 
the agency’s powers and jurisdiction and increased the stringency 
of disclosure rules and other regulatory standards.21  In April 2002, 
following the election of Schröder’s SPD-Green coalition in late 
1998, the process of regulatory centralization reached its peak as 
the German Parliament consolidated all financial market and 
services regulation, including the regulation of securities markets, 
banking, and insurance, and folded the BAWe within one massive 
agency, the German Financial Supervisory Authority 
(Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, “BAFin”).22  
                                            
20 Second Financial Market Promotion Act (Gesetz über den Wertpapierhandel 
und zur Änderung börsenrechtlicher und wertpapierrechtlicher Vorschriften, 
Zweites Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz) of 26 July 1994, Federal Law Gazette, 
Part I, p. 1749. 
21 From late 1997 through 1998, another series of Financial Market Promotion 
Laws and other legislative changes markedly expanded the agency’s role in 
regulating and policing German securities markets.  The BAWe came to oversee 
the filing of prospectuses, the financial disclosure by public companies, insider 
trading, and the reporting of voting rights and ownership stakes.  It now also 
supervises financial services providers, stock brokers, the stock exchanges, and 
cooperates with other national securities regulators.  (See Cioffi, 2002b)   
22 Law on Integrated Financial Services Supervision (Gesetz über die integrierte 
Finanzaufsicht (“FinDAG”)), April 22, 2002 (effective May 1, 2002). 
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With this reform, Germany surpassed the United States in the 
centralized administration of financial services regulation. 
Consensus was far harder to find when policy debate turned to 
company law reform.  The CDU-CSU led coalition balked at more 
substantial corporate governance reform.  Corporate managers 
were—and remain—both a core constituency of the center-right 
Christian Democrats.  They had been willing to acquiesce in 
securities law reform, but, nestled within the protective network 
structure of “German Inc.”, many rejected company law reforms 
that would more directly reduce their autonomy from 
shareholders.  Opposition was particularly intense among owners 
and managers of many small and medium sized firms within the 
Mittelstand, often referred to as the backbone of the German 
economy, who feared that further reforms would threaten family 
control of firms and their stable sources of credit within the 
established bank-centered financial system.  The Free Democratic 
Party (FDP) was hamstrung: it was part of a CDU-CSU led 
coalition that declined to press for reform, but the leadership of 
Germany’s sole liberal party with historically close links to major 
banks, favored corporate governance reform.   
The center-left Social Democratic Party took up this reform 
agenda, first in opposition in the Bundestag and then as the 
governing party under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder.  Since the 
late 1990s, the SPD has used corporate governance reform as the 
centerpiece of its own policy agenda of economic modernization 
and to cast the CDU-CSU conservative alliance as the defender of 
insular managerial elites in an increasingly outmoded and 
dysfunctional economic model.23  The SPD claimed a strategic 
centrist policy position on corporate governance reform that 
complemented the pursuit of financial system modernization and 
internationalization by many large banks.  The party sought and 
                                            
23 See Cioffi 2002b; Höpner 2003.  For an excellent account and analysis of the 
ways in which the Schröder government sought to create a shareholding culture 
in Germany during the late 1990s, see Ziegler, 2000. 
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obtained the support of major financial institutions.  This placed 
the conservative CDU-CSU and their neo-liberal allies in the FDP 
in a difficult position.  They had long relied upon the support of 
business and financial elites, which were now splitting over 
financial market and corporate governance reform.   
Schröder’s centrists were able to overcome—for a time—objections 
from segments of organized labor (particularly the rank-and-file) 
and traditionalist left-wing factions who were suspicious of Anglo-
American “casino capitalism.”24  In part, the centrists prevailed 
because the corporate governance policy agenda appealed to long-
standing ideological concerns of the German left.  Both the SPD 
and Green parties have opposed the traditional insularity of 
Germany’s conservative and hierarchical economic elite.25  
Corporate governance reform by the SPD leadership appealed to 
the Greens’ ideological preferences for economic decentralization 
and devolution even though this necessitated regulatory 
centralization.  (Cioffi, 2002b, Höpner, 2003)   
In 1998, the SPD, then still in the opposition, took advantage of 
shifting policy preferences among interest groups to engineer the 
first major overhaul of company law since 1965.  This successful 
campaign played upon popular resentment of “bank power” 
among core SPD constituents while casting the party as led by 
business-friendly pragmatists.26  The proposed legislation put the 
CDU on the defensive and forced the Kohl government to support 
a compromise version of the Control and Transparency Act 
(“KonTraG”), which moderated the anti-bank provisions while 
                                            
24 Indeed, Schröder’s rise within the SPD and his victory in this policy debate 
indicates the decline of these traditional powers within German social 
democracy.   
25 For an excellent account of this ideological aspect of German social 
democracy in historical perspective, see Höpner 2003.   
26 For a detailed discussion of the SPD’s pseudo-populist strategy to gain left-
wing support for governance reform, see Cioffi 2002b. 
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retaining more important governance reforms.27  The SPD 
leadership claimed credit as modernizing reformers, maintained 
credibility with their left wing, painted the CDU as beholden to 
corporate interests, and cultivated closer relations with the 
financial sector.   
The KonTraG complemented the prior massive overhaul of 
securities law by addressing issues of bank power, the function of 
the supervisory board, auditing, share voting rights, stock options, 
and litigation rules.  The law sought to reduce the power of 
Germany’s banks in voting shares and supervisory board 
representation while strengthening their disclosure and fiduciary 
obligations to shareholders.28  However, these restrictions were 
acceptable to the larger financial institutions and fit with their 
abandonment of the post-war relational banking model.  More 
than four years before the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
German law required the supervisory boards of listed firms to hire 
and oversee the external auditor instead of the management 
board.29   
                                            
27 Corporate Control and Transparency Act (Gesetz zur Kontrolle und 
Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich, “KonTraG”) of 27 April 1998, Federal 
Law Gazette, Part I, p. 786 (Gesetz vom 27.4.1998, BGBl. I, S. 786 vom 
30.4.1998).  For a political analysis of the KonTraG, see Cioffi 2002b. 
28 If the bank’s holdings in a listed firm exceed 5% of the corporation’s stock, it 
can vote their own equity stakes or vote the proxy votes of the shares deposited 
by its brokerage customers—but not both.  The rules on the voting of shares by 
banks in corporate decision making were designed to use the traditional bank-
centered proxy voting system while allowing alternative mechanisms of proxy 
voting to emerge (e.g., shareholders’ associations).  The KonTraG also required 
banks to disclose all board mandates held by their representatives, their 
ownership stakes in firms, and alternative ways for their share depositors to 
exercise their votes.  (Seibert, 1998; Cioffi 2002b) 
29 The law contains additional auditing reforms to ensure the independence and 
reliability of auditors.  An auditor may not audit a firm if it has earned more 
than 30% of its revenues from the client over the past five years and must 
change the signatory of the audit if the same person has signed the report more 
than six times in ten years.  The KonTraG also raised the limitation on auditor 
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The KonTraG also imposed a “one share, one vote rule” that 
mandates equal voting rights and abolishes voting caps among 
shares of common stock, while prohibiting the voting of cross-
shareholding stakes above 25% (a blocking minority under 
German company law) in supervisory board elections.  These 
provisions were designed to prevent managers and minority 
shareholders from wresting control from the majority.  However, 
by weakening their defensive ownership structures, this new 
structure of voting rights exposed some German firms to 
unprecedented threats of hostile takeover—a fact underappreciated 
at the time but one that would soon prove politically contentious.   
Corporate governance reform took an additional leap forward in 
July 2000 when the Schröder government pushed through a major 
tax reform law (Steuerreform), over strenuous opposition from the 
Christian Democrats, that abolished capital gains taxes on the sale 
of cross-shareholdings.  The reform simultaneously accomplished 
three goals.  First, it further cultivated support of the financial 
services sector which held a large share of these cross-
shareholdings.  Second, it provided a means to improve the 
liquidity of domestic stock markets by increasing the proportion 
of shares actively traded.  And third, it fit within a longer-term 
strategy of using capital market pressures to force firms to 
restructure and improve efficiency, both by encouraging the 
development of securities markets and by undermining the 
ownership networks that had insulated German corporations from 
takeovers.  (See Holloway, 2001)   
The takeover vulnerability created by the company and tax law 
reforms, along with the fear instilled in managers by Vodafone’s 
hostile takeover of Mannesmann in early 2000, triggered a 
backlash against the further liberalization of German corporate 
                                                                                                                
liability from 500,000 DM to 8 million DM for listed corporations (2 million 
DM for unlisted companies).  (Cioffi 2002b) 
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governance.30  The growing domestic political conflict over 
takeovers spilled over into the EU’s attempt to adopt Takeover 
Directive that would have liberalized Europe’s market for 
corporate control.  German managers, unionists, conservatives, 
and left-wing Social Democrats alike mobilized and blocked the 
directive in the European Parliament in July 2001. This was the 
first major defeat suffered by the European Commission in pursuit 
of a single EU market.31  A week after the rejection of the EU 
Takeover Directive, the German cabinet approved Germany’s first 
takeover law, the Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act, 
designed to facilitate takeovers and a market for corporate control.  
The same disparate coalition mobilized against the Act.32  The 
government ultimately diffused the controversy surrounding the 
Takeover Act by diluting the shareholder-centered approach to 
takeover regulation in the draft law and the Bundestag passed it in 
November 2001.33   
                                            
30 At the time Mannesmann was taken over, prior to the enactment of the July 
2000 tax reform law, corporate Germany appeared unruffled.  Interviews 
conducted by the author, as well as journalistic accounts, indicate that the fears 
of German managers grew when they considered the cumulative takeover 
vulnerability created by the KonTraG and tax reform in the absence of 
alternative anti-takeover defenses.  For an excellent analysis of the 
Mannesmann takeover, see Höpner and Jackson, 2001. 
31 For an extended discussion of the relation between the politics of German 
corporate governance and the failure of the EU Takeover Directive, see Cioffi, 
2002b. 
32 See Braude, 2000a, 2000b; Braude and Hong, 2001, Barbier, 2001; Williamson, 
2001; Wood, 2001 
33 Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act (Wertpapierwerbs- und 
Übernahmegesetzvom) of December 20, 2001, BGBl. 1, 2001, 3822 (effective 
January 1, 2002); see also Ashurst Morris Crisp, 2002 (translation).  Rather than 
enshrining the primacy of shareholder interests in law, the Takeover Act obliges 
both the offeror and the target’s management to disclose information 
concerning the offer to either the works council or directly to the employees, 
and it entitles organized labor to two representatives on the government’s 
thirteen-member takeover “advisory board.”   
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After these bitter political conflicts over the basic character of the 
German economy and the balance of managerial, financial, and 
labor power, the SPD government retrenched and adopted a 
corporate governance policy that sought to maintain the balance 
among contending stakeholder interests. To compensate the 
unions and left-wing Social Democrats that had supported or 
acquiesced in pro-shareholder reforms, codetermination legislation 
passed with government support in 2001 marginally expanded the 
powers of works councils and makes them somewhat easier for 
employees to form.  This careful balance of stakeholder power 
with increased shareholder protections was displayed again as the 
government appointed two successive corporate governance 
commissions.34  The first, under the chairmanship of law professor 
Theodor Baums, drew representatives from major interest groups 
and was charged with drafting a comprehensive code of best 
practices in German corporate governance.  The second 
commission, the permanent Government Commission on 
Corporate Governance (known as the Cromme Commission) was 
also largely comprised of peak association and interest group 
representatives.  It adopted a Code of Best Practices and made over 
150 recommendations to improve disclosure and transparency; 
strengthen the role, obligations, and independence of corporate 
boards; improve external auditing; and modernize corporate 
finance rules.  Most important was a “comply or explain” rule, 
                                            
34 Much of this account is based on an interview with Theodor Baums, July 9, 
2003, Frankfurt.  See also Baums Commission Report (Bericht der 
Regierungskommission Corporate Governance), July 10, 2001 (complete official 
German version available at www.otto-schmidt.de/corporate_governance.htm, 
English summary available at 
http://www.shearman.com/publications/cm_pubs.html); Government 
Commission of the German Corporate Governance Code (Cromme 
Commission), German Corporate Governance Code, adopted February 26, 2002, 
as amended May 21, 2003 (information and official German version and English 
translation available at http://www.corporate-governance-code.de/index-
e.html). 
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since enacted by Parliament35, that requires firms to comply with 
the Code of Best Practice or file a public disclosure statement 
explaining its reasons for not doing so.  Tellingly, the politically 
explosive subject of codetermination was excluded from both 
commissions’ mandates for fear of destroying consensus on all 
other issues.   
The SPD-Green coalition has been forced to confront the political 
constraints on corporate governance reform.  The Schröder 
government has been fighting an increasingly tense two-front 
battle, not only against the CDU, FDP, and corporate managers, 
but also against the SPD left wing and industrial unions opposed 
to further liberalization of corporate governance and the neo-
liberal tendencies of finance capitalism.  As in the American case, 
political conflict intensified and reform slowed when policy began 
to impinge on the basic allocation of economic power in society.  
But the serious erosion of the government’s left-wing support and 
sagging SPD electoral fortunes even in core strongholds forced a 
retrenchment of its reform agenda.  As a result, corporate 
governance reform has fallen off since 2002.   
 
IV.  THE COMPARATIVE REGULATORY POLITICS OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM 
The narrative accounts of corporate governance reform detailed 
above show that regulatory intervention in the structure and 
operation of firms and financial markets has undergone 
remarkable change since 1990.  (See Tables 3 & 4)  They also 
highlight a number of important common structural trends in the 
United States and Germany: (1) regulatory centralization and 
institutionalization, (2) the displacement of self-regulation by 
                                            
35 See Transparency and Disclosure Act (TraPuG ) (Gesetz zur weiteren Reform 
des Aktien- und Bilanzrechts, zu Transparenz und Publizität (Transparenz- und 
Publizitätsgesetz) of July 19, 2002, BGBl. I 2002, 2681. 
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formal legal rules, (3) the expansion of market facilitating 
disclosure and transparency regulation, and (4) the use of 
structural regulation to protect shareholders by altering the 
corporation’s internal form and power relations.  These trends 
demonstrate a significant expansion of state power in the economy 
and its active reshaping of the private sphere in the age of finance 
capitalism.  They also underscore the decisive importance of the 
state and the role of the center-left in the politics of reform.   
  
TABLE 3: MODIFIED GOVERNANCE MODELS AND THE EFFECTS OF REFORM IN 
THE UNITED STATES (1990-2005) 
 
UNITED STATES 
SECURITIES 
LAW 
• Institutional investors’ governance role strengthened by proxy 
rules deregulation (1992). 
• Securities litigation reform limits shareholder fraud suits, 
empowers institutional investors as “lead plaintiffs” (1995, 
1998). 
• Transparency regulation strengthened by Regulation FD and 
other more stringent disclosure, risk management, & 
certification rules (2000, 2002-2004). 
• Creation of the PCAOB and assertion of greater federal 
regulatory control over accounting rules (2002-present). 
• Enhanced statutory civil & criminal penalties, extension of 
securities fraud statute of limitations (2002). 
• Increased SEC enforcement actions (2001-2005). 
COMPANY 
LAW  
• Spread of state anti-takeover laws (1980s-early 1990s). 
• Federal law encroaches on state corporate law by requiring 
greater board independence & control over external auditing, 
and empowering board to hire own professional staff (2002). 
• Improved risk management & internal monitoring procedures, 
certification of accounts and monitoring by CEO & CFO 
(2002). 
LABOR LAW 
• No significant change. 
 
  
TABLE 4: MODIFIED GOVERNANCE MODELS AND THE EFFECTS OF REFORM IN THE GERMANY (1990-2005) 
 
GERMANY 
SECURITIES 
LAW 
• Centralization and increased stringency of securities 
regulation under jurisdiction of a single federal regulatory 
agency. 
• Creation and steady strengthening of disclosure rules. 
• Increased transparency & financial reporting by public firms. 
• Banks increasingly focused on securities markets & financial 
services.  
COMPANY 
LAW  
• Restructuring of supervisory board responsibilities for 
auditing and risk management. 
• Institution of one share-one vote rule. 
• Takeover law allows some anti-takeover defenses. 
• Strengthens transparency & rights of small shareholders. 
• Bars golden and shares and voting caps—empowers both minority 
and controlling shareholders. 
• Stakeholder system of representation & governance preserved. 
LABOR LAW 
• Works council codetermination modestly strengthened by 
making election easier & expanding consultation rights. 
• Too early to tell effect; likely to be marginal. 
ENFORCEMENT 
MECHANISMS 
• Securities regulator given formal investigative powers.  
• Marginal strengthening of private litigation rules. 
• Increased regulatory enforcement of securities regulation. 
• No significant change in private litigation (though more suits filed 
after stock market crash of 2000). 
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Corporate governance reform in these very different political 
economies highlights the central role of state actors in 
institutional change and the restoration of systemic legitimacy.  
State actors play central coordinating and policy formulation roles 
in the development of institutional and regulatory structures on 
which sophisticated modern markets depend.   Internal division, 
uncertainty, and loss of legitimacy under crisis conditions 
prevented interest groups from blocking reform but also from 
proposing coherent policy solutions.  Shareholders were simply 
too weak to drive reform politics and policymaking.  These 
conditions of economic crisis and uncertainty gave political actors 
greater autonomy in articulating and imposing reform agendas 
that made use of new regulatory approaches, mechanisms, and 
institutions to engineer institutional change and regulatory 
innovation.   
The primary political proponents of reform in both the United 
States and Germany came from the center-left—the Democratic 
Party in the United States and Germany’s SPD and Green Party.  
The more conservative Republicans and CDU were generally far 
more resistant to pro-shareholder reforms.  The logic of the 
political left advancing the cause of shareholders and finance 
capital appears counterintuitive, but is quite straightforward.  
(Cioffi, 2002b, 2005; Höpner, 2003; Cioffi and Höpner, 2004)  
Reform threatened the interests, power, and positions of 
established managerial elites closely allied with conservative 
parties.  In both countries, conservative parties were the defenders 
of the managerial elite and the corporate status quo—but 
circumstances had brought the status quo into disrepute.   
Crises opened strategic political avenues to reformist center-left 
parties.  Center-left policymakers embraced corporate governance 
reform as a means of appealing to middle class voters resentful of 
economic elites while claiming the banner of reform and economic 
modernization.  The Democratic Party in the United States took 
this opportunity to attack the Republican’s anti-regulation and 
pro-manager stance, while appealing to middle class voters and 
investors who believed in free but fair markets.  Reform was 
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popular, consistent with the Democrats’ historical support for the 
expansion of the regulatory state, and put the Republicans on the 
defensive.  In Germany, the SPD’s corporate governance reforms 
satisfied left-wing and populist constituencies by targeting 
managerial (and to some extent banking) elites, yet also attracted 
support from the middle class, financial sector, and portions of the 
managerial elite by promoting policies that promised higher 
returns to savings and financial capital, more efficient capital 
allocation and corporate restructuring, and increased rates of 
growth and innovation.   
In both the United States and Germany, governance reform fit 
surprisingly well with the center-left’s ideological and 
programmatic attempts to reconcile state intervention in the 
economy with market economics.  The Democratic Party and the 
SPD have both championed the regulatory state to ameliorate 
market failures and as a counterweight to concentrated corporate 
and managerial power.  Both have an interest in protecting private 
pension assets on which the middle and working classes 
increasingly depend for retirement income.  The German Greens 
were likewise attracted to the cause of corporate governance 
reform and even more driven by the prospect of decentralizing 
economic power within domestic corporate and financial 
networks.  Governance and securities law reform thus appealed to 
the center-left’s egalitarian ideology and policy agenda.  (Höpner 
2003; cf. Cioffi 2002b)  This is a highly simplified sketch of 
complex party political dynamics.  Even so, the general point 
holds: corporate governance reform—a crucial institutional 
foundation of finance capitalism—is largely a project of the 
political left, rather than the ostensibly pro-business or neo-liberal 
right.   
Despite these similarities, however, the Democrats and the SPD 
advanced their legislative agendas under starkly different 
institutional and political conditions that yielded fundamental 
differences in the process and substance of corporate governance 
reform.  The fragmentation of American political institutions and 
interest groups makes deliberative and sustained reform programs 
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difficult, if not impossible.  These characteristics favor rapid 
legislative responses and convulsive episodic reforms under crisis 
conditions.  Consequently, the severity of the post-Enron 
American corporate governance crisis triggered a sudden—and 
relatively short—episode of reform politics (c. 2002-2004).  
Reformist Democrats pursued a more activist regulatory agenda as 
interest groups splintered under economic and political pressure 
and most Republicans retreated to distance themselves from 
corruption and misconduct.  The reformers’ political weakness 
became evident from their inability to withstand the anti-reform 
backlash by a resurgent as political alliance of political 
conservatives and corporate managers against reform as these 
crisis conditions dissipated.  In Germany, “politics as usual” is 
also often characterized by policy paralysis within a political 
system that demands consensus.  However, shifting policy 
preferences and the centralization of representation within peak 
associations, against background conditions of European economic 
integration and legal harmonization, produced new interest group 
alignments and party strategies that sustained corporate 
governance reform for over a decade (c. 1993 to present).36   
As the politics of reform differed between the United States and 
Germany, so did the significance and substance of the policy 
outcomes.  The reforms adopted in these two country cases served 
fundamentally different ends.  The American reforms tended to 
reinforce the shareholder-centered and market-driven 
characteristics of the established American regime.  The 
innovations of structural regulation were left deeply flawed and 
incomplete after the defeat of the SEC attempt to reform of 
shareholder voting and board elections.  Though it may prove to 
be a point of departure in a new developmental trajectory away 
                                            
36 Commitment to European integration played an important role in promoting 
financial market and corporate governance reform, but support for EU legal 
harmonization and the Single Market Program did not extend to takeover and 
company law reform.  As shown above, domestic politics governed the outcome 
of these policy debates.   
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from managerialism, Sarbanes-Oxley does not represent a 
fundamental break with the established institutional 
arrangements and power relations of American corporate 
governance as did the New Deal reforms of the 1930s.   
In contrast, the German reforms were transformative and 
fundamentally altered the domestic corporate governance regime.  
Financial system and corporate governance reform constitutes a 
major episode of institution building and structural change that 
reflects a fundamental realignment of domestic political forces.37  
German elites sought to systematically restructure their financial 
and company law systems in response to pressing economic 
problems.  American politicians had no such systemic reform 
agenda and merely sought an immediate response to the political 
and economic threats posed by pervasive corporate scandals.  If the 
American corporate governance model has remained more 
resilient, it is because Germany’s had to go through a more 
substantial transformation to develop the framework of law and 
regulation necessary for finance capitalism.     
The position of labor and employees as stakeholders the most 
striking difference between the American and German corporate 
governance regimes.  The exclusion of employees and labor 
interests from the American corporate governance was not even 
discussed, let alone challenged, in the political debate over reform.  
Consequently, American corporate governance reform has taken a 
shareholder-centered form.  In contrast, German works council 
reform and the refusal of the government’s corporate governance 
commissions to even address codetermination has preserved 
Germany’s stakeholder model.  Indeed, these most recent 
developments reflect the increased importance of firm-level 
stakeholder governance as a forum for the negotiation of economic 
conflict.  The more consensual and coordinated policy process in 
                                            
37 The prospect of labor market, pension, and social welfare reforms in Germany 
under the SPD’s “Agenda 2010” further reinforce the impression that the 
German social market economy is now at a critical juncture. 
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Germany promoted this more thoroughgoing and longer-term 
systemic reform, but also required continued accommodation of 
labor interests.  Germany remains a stakeholder model of 
corporate governance in important ways.  Finance capitalism is 
not the same as shareholder capitalism.   
Current political developments point to continued and 
intensifying political conflict over corporate governance.  The 
erosion of the SPD’s base of political support due to struggles over 
economic reform and economic performance herald increasing 
conflict over the basic structure and character of German 
capitalism.  The incorporation of pro-shareholder securities 
regulation and corporate law principles poses a potential threat to 
the consensual German corporate governance regime and social 
market economy.  These conflicts would threaten the vaunted 
institutional complementarities of the German model—high-skill, 
high-wage labor, and high-value added production financed by 
supplies of “patient capital”—and the comparative economic 
advantages they confer.  Germany’s adoption of transparency 
regulation and company law rules favoring shareholder interests 
may sharpen conflicts among managers, shareholders, and 
employees that post-war institutional arrangements ameliorated.   
In the American case, the expansion of federal regulatory authority 
into the traditionally non-federal areas of accounting and corporate 
law has already intensified political conflict over corporate 
governance policy.  (Cioffi, 2005)  Managers, financial institutions, 
and political conservatives have already begun to attack the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and related SEC rulemaking as excessively 
costly and damaging to American business.   (Id.)  A backlash 
against corporate governance reform has gathered force.  The fierce 
battle over shareholder proxy voting, mounting political attacks 
on other reforms, and the resignation of two successive SEC 
Chairmen under political pressure indicate that the corporate 
governance reforms of 2002-2004 established new points of 
conflict, not a new policy consensus.   
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Corporate governance reform has become a front in broader 
political battles over the future of the regulatory state and political 
economic change.  If the 1990s was the decade of faith in financial 
markets, the turn of the 21st century has ushered in a more sober 
but also more contentious era of regulatory politics embedded in 
domestic regulatory politics and legal institutions.  This suggests 
that finance capitalism is less likely than ever to take a single 
homogenizing form and more likely to develop in nationally 
distinctive forms.  Corporate governance reform has redrawn the 
political battle lines over regulation, corporate power, and the 
future of finance capitalism in the United States and Germany.  
They have not brought a lasting peace.   
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